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Internalizing the global negative externality of carbon emissions requires flattening the 
extraction path of world fossil energy resources (= world carbon emissions). We consider 
governments having sign-unconstrained emission taxes at their disposal and seeking to 
prevent world emissions from exceeding some binding aggregate emission ceiling in the 
medium term. Such a ceiling policy can be carried out either in full cooperation of all (major) 
carbon emitting countries or by a sub-global climate coalition. Unilateral action has to cope 
with carbon leakage and high costs which makes a strong case for choosing a policy that 
implements the ceiling in a cost-effective way. In a two-country two-period general 
equilibrium model with a non-renewable fossil-energy resource we characterize the unilateral 
cost-effective ceiling policy and compare it with its fully cooperative counterpart. We show 
that with full cooperation there exists a cost-effective ceiling policy in which only first-period 
emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across countries. In contrast, the cost-effective 
ceiling policy of a sub-global climate coalition is characterized by emission regulation in both 
periods. That policy may consist either of positive tax rates in both periods or of negative tax 
rates (= subsidies) in both periods or of a positive rate in the first and a negative rate in the 
second period. The share of the total stock of energy resources owned by the sub-global 
climate coalition turns out to be a decisive determinant of the sign and magnitude of unilateral 
cost-effective taxes. 
JEL-Code: H220, Q320, Q540. 
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 1 The problem
Scientiﬁc evidence strongly suggests that global warming is caused by anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions, notably by emissions of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels.1
Carbon emissions create allocative distortions and global welfare losses in the absence of
climate policy, because emissions generate external costs rendering sub-optimal the laissez-
faire time path of emissions. The shape of welfare enhancing emission pathways depends on
various factors such as stock-dependent extraction costs, low-carbon resource substitutes,
the severity of climate damage, and the size of discount rates. The important question
whether reductions in the present value of welfare losses suﬀered in laissez faire are or are
not feasible without reducing cumulative emissions cannot be easily answered on empirical
grounds. In the model to be analyzed here the world stock of fossil energy is given and
will be fully depleted in the laissez-faire world economy. Moreover, we share the view that
"... public policies that would limit the overall extraction and exempt part of the stock in
situ permanently from extraction ... seem hardly defendable" (Sinn 2008, p. 376)2 because
renewables are imperfect substitutes for fossil fuels and because a demand for the latter can
always be expected even if extraction costs are increasing in cumulative extraction (and a
fortiori under the simplifying assumption of zero extraction costs).3
There is scope for welfare-enhancing climate policies that do not limit overall extrac-
tion for the following reason. Recent climate research (Allen et al. 2009, Meinshausen et al.
2009) suggests (i) that there is a strong correlation between the maximum level of warming
and cumulative emissions and (ii) that peak warming does not depend on the shape of the
emission pathway. These ﬁndings do not imply, however, that the time path of warming up
to the peak and beyond is independent of the emission pathway. Clearly, the ﬂatter is the
time path of emissions - keeping cumulative emissions ﬁxed - the later the peak of warming
will be attained. As damage from global warming is increasing in the mean temperature,
standard welfare economics suggests that in the laissez-faire scenario too much carbon is
emitted too early. Hence ﬂattening the emission pathway is welfare enhancing for the entire
world, and some (presumably more moderate) ﬂattening is then also welfare enhancing for
a sub-global climate coalition when the rest of the world abstains from climate policy.
1In the present paper we disregard greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide.
2Hoel (2010) and Michielsen (2011) also assume that an exogenously given stock of fossil fuel is fully
exhausted.
3There is another strand of literature which focuses on climate policy instruments capable to impact
on the level of cumulative extraction of fossil fuel resources. See e.g. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010),
Grafton et al. (2010), Kalkuhl and Edenhofer (2010) and Gerlagh (2011).
1In our subsequent analysis we do not explicitly model these welfare-economic consid-
erations although the motivation for the study of those global or sub-global climate policies
which ﬂatten the laissez-faire extraction/emission path is based on the arguments outlined
above. To further simplify we envisage a global or sub-global climate coalition that seeks
to prevent cumulative world emissions from exceeding some ceiling in the medium term,
say 2050, which is tighter than the global cumulative emissions until 2050 in the absence
of climate policy. Its implementation therefore requires a proactive policy approach which
we denote as ceiling policy, for short.
We study ceiling policies of an international sub-global climate coalition in an eﬀort
to account in a very stylized way, though, for the state and perspectives of the ongoing
international climate negotiations. The political goal of keeping the world mean tempera-
ture from rising in the medium term by 2◦ Celsius or more above preindustrial levels has
been endorsed by numerous governments and most recently also by the UN Conference of
the Parties in Cancun (UNFCCC 2010). We interpret that as the acknowledgement of a
target to ﬂatten the world carbon extraction path. If an international agreement will be
reached at all in the future, it will likely be on a medium term emission ceiling. Yet in
view of the poor progress made in international climate negotiations over the last decades,
an agreement encompassing all (major) countries can hardly be expected. That is why our
emphasis is on ceiling policies of a sub-global climate coalition (which needs to be larger
than the European Union) while the grand coalition serves as a benchmark only. The
countries in such a sub-global coalition are supposed to follow a cooperative approach and
implement a medium term ceiling they have agreed upon. That is far more than what we
observe at present, where various individual countries carry out - or have announced to
carry out - some carbon mitigation policies. The pledges have been made without inter-
national coordination and without binding commitments which is why the net eﬀect of all
these non-cooperative national actions on world emissions is unclear.
In the present paper we envisage a sub-global climate coalition and presuppose that
there exist feasible ceiling policies for that coalition (which can safely be assumed, if the
coalition is not too small and the ceiling is not too tight). The focus is then on characterizing
the set of feasible ceiling policies and on investigating properties of that particular feasible
ceiling policy which achieves the predetermined ceiling at minimum cost for the coalition.
For reference purposes we will also compare the cost-eﬀective ceiling policy of the sub-global
coalition to the fully cooperative cost-eﬀective ceiling policy.
This paper is related to the literature on carbon leakage which arises when one coun-
try’s unilateral emission reduction policy increases the emissions in other countries. The
2so-called green paradox (Sinn 2008, Eichner and Pethig 2011) is said to occur in the extreme
case in which unilateral emission reductions increase rather than reduce aggregate world
emissions, as compared to their level in the absence of that unilateral policy.4 Hoel (1991),
Bohm (1993), Golombek and Hoel (2004), Copeland and Taylor (2005), Di Maria and van
der Werf (2005), Ishikawa and Kiyono (2006), van der Ploeg and Withagen (2009), Eichner
and Pethig (2011) have analytically explored various channels and determinants of carbon
leakage and/or the green paradox. The green paradox is not an issue in the present paper,
because by presupposition, the unilaterally acting sub-global climate coalition avoids exces-
sive leakage by choosing appropriate tax rates in all periods. In that respect our approach
is closer to Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Kalkuhl and Edenhofer (2010) who employ the
ceiling or carbon budget approach and characterize the cost-eﬀective (cooperative) carbon
budget policy. However, these studies employ one-country growth models. To our knowl-
edge the extant literature does not consider sub-global climate coalitions pursuing a policy
of limiting cumulative medium-term emissions.
We will carry out the analysis in a stylized two-country two-period model similar to
that in Eichner and Pethig (2011). Each country owns a share of the ﬁnite world stock of
fossil-energy resource. Governments are assumed to have at their disposal emission taxes
in both periods. The carbon ceiling limits both countries’ overall ﬁrst-period emissions and
is binding, i.e. is ﬁxed below the countries’ overall ﬁrst-period emissions in the laissez-
faire economy. First we characterize the fully cooperative cost-eﬀective ceiling policy as
a benchmark. It turns out that in this case cost eﬀectiveness can be achieved through a
ceiling policy in which only ﬁrst-period emissions are taxed at a rate that is uniform across
countries. That policy is in the spirit of results from dynamic one-country models (e.g.
Sinclair 1992, 1994, Sinn 2008) in which ﬂattening the fossil-fuel extraction path requires
high emission taxes early on and low or no taxes later.
Next we investigate the case of unilateral ceiling policies where the sub-global climate
coalition is represented by one of the countries in our two-country model. In its eﬀort
to meet the ceiling in unilateral action that country’s challenge is to restrict total ﬁrst-
period emissions via its domestic emission taxes which have an impact only on domestic
emissions in both periods and thus fail to have full control over the ceiling. Knowing that
the government of the other country abstains from climate policy, the active country carries
out its ceiling policy strategically in the sense that it takes into account the responses to its
tax policy of all domestic and foreign consumers and ﬁrms. We show that there is a large
4There are various related concepts of green paradox, e.g. "...that anticipation of future reductions in
demand for oil and other fossil fuels will drive the resource owners to bring forward their supply." (Gerlagh
2011).
3set of feasible ceiling policies for one and the same predetermined ceiling (under the implicit
assumption that the ceiling is not too tight) and we classify these policies with respect to
the sign and magnitude of tax rates and with respect to the prices of fossil fuel and the
consumption good corresponding to each policy. There are feasible policies with positive
tax rates (emission taxes proper) in both periods, with negative tax rates (subsidies) in both
periods, and there are feasible policies with a positive tax rate in the ﬁrst and a negative
rate in the second period. All these policies diﬀer, of course, with respect to the cost (=
welfare loss) accruing to the country that undertakes the unilateral action. It is therefore
of great interest to identify the least-cost ceiling policy among the feasible policies. We ﬁnd
that the sign and magnitude of tax rates constituting the cost-eﬀective unilateral ceiling
policy depend on the distribution of ownership of the stock of fossil energy. The larger the
resource stock of the country is that implements the ceiling unilaterally, the larger is the
shift of ﬁrst and second-period tax rates from positive to negative rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 brieﬂy
investigates the properties of the cooperative cost-eﬀective ceiling policy and characterizes
unilateral ceiling policies. We focus on feasibility of unilateral ceiling policies in the ﬁrst
part and on cost eﬀectiveness of unilateral ceiling policies in the second part of Section 3.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The competitive two-country economy with carbon
ceiling regulation
The structure of the model. In period t = 1,2 country i = A,B produces the amount
xs





The representative consumer in country i derives utility,
ui = U
i(xi1,xi2), (2)
from consuming the amount xit of good X in period t. Fossil fuel is a non-renewable
resource. Its total stock is ¯ e and country i owns the share αi (i = A,B) of that stock,
where αA = (1 − αB) ∈ [0,1].
Carbon emissions are generated in strict proportion to the amount of fossil fuel con-
sumed. Hence with suitable deﬁnitions of units, eit denotes fuel consumption as well as
4carbon emissions. The supply constraints for fossil fuel and for the consumption good X,





Bt = xAt + xBt t = 1,2 (4)
are obvious feasibility requirements. They turn into world market equilibrium conditions
in the competitive economy studied below.
Regulation, competitive markets, and the agents’ optimization problems. The
principal target of regulation is to keep total ﬁrst-period emissions from exceeding an upper
bound ¯ e1 > 0, which translates into the constraint
¯ e1 = eA1 + eB1. (5)
We refer to ¯ e1 as (carbon) ceiling, for short. By ruling out the greater sign in the constraint
(5) we restrict attention to ceilings ¯ e1 that are smaller than total ﬁrst-period emissions in
the absence of regulation.5 Consequently, some fossil-fuel consumption needs to be shifted
from the ﬁrst to the second period as compared with the laissez-faire scenario. That is
exactly what the ceiling policy is about.
To meet the ceiling, the governments of both countries have the option of regulating
their domestic carbon emissions in either period. They can do so in two conceptually
equivalent ways. Either they introduce national cap-and-trade schemes in one or both
periods, where the emission cap of country i in period t is the politically chosen level of
eit and where πit is the corresponding permit price. In that case, the independent policy
variable is the cap eit and the permit price adjusts as to equilibrate the permit market.
Alternatively, we interpret πit as the rate of an emission tax country i levies in period t.
In that case, the tax is the independent policy variable the regulator chooses such that the
resultant endogenous emissions eA1 and eB1 meet the ceiling ¯ e1. However, in the present
context these alternative interpretations are not equivalent because scenarios with ’negative
emission prices’ πit for some i and t will turn out to be relevant. As negative prices cannot
emerge as permit market equilibrium prices we stick to the tax policy interpretation in the
sequel with the understanding that a negative tax is a subsidy.6
We will focus on two policy scenarios. In the ﬁrst benchmark case both countries
cooperate and coordinate their tax policies to implement the ceiling. In the second scenario
5The limiting case of the ceiling being equal to laissez-faire emissions will turn out to be of some interest
in Section 4.
6To avoid complicated wording we refer to πit as a tax rate except in speciﬁc results where we have
explicitly established that πit < 0.
5country B refrains from taxing emissions altogether (πB1 = πB2 ≡ 0) while country A
proceeds to meet the ceiling in unilateral action.
The ceiling policy is embedded in a perfectly competitive two-country economy. In
each period t = 1,2 there exists a world market for the consumption good X with price
pxt and a world market for fossil fuel with price pet. We take the consumption good X in
period 1 as numéraire, px1 = 1, and write px2 = px for convenience of notation.
Although productive capital is not modeled, there is a ﬁnancial market for consumer
savings and loans. As shown in the Appendix A, that credit market is cleared at any ﬁxed
interest rate, r, if the second-period markets for energy and the consumption good are in
equilibrium. For analytical convenience we normalize the interest rate to be zero (r ≡ 0).7
In each country i a resource ﬁrm extracts the domestic stock of fossil fuel, ¯ ei = αi¯ e, over
both periods. With zero extraction costs assumed we simplify the exposition by considering
one ’aggregate’ resource ﬁrm (rater than two separate ﬁrms) the share αi of which is owned





t petet (where the last term follows from r ≡ 0). The resource ﬁrm
maximizes its present value proﬁts subject to e1 +e2 = ¯ e which yields the simple Hotelling
rule pe1 = pe2 =: pe. As country i owns the share αi of the resource stock, it claims the
share αi of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
The representative consumer of country i maximizes utility Ui(xi1,xi2) subject to the
consolidated budget constraint8 xi1 +
pxxi2
1+r = xi1 + pxxi2 =: yi, where country i’s present
value of total income is
yi = [x
s
i1 − (pe + πi1ei1)] +
pxxs


















= px i = A,B. (7)
In each country i an aggregate price-taking ﬁrm produces the consumption good
X. Maximizing proﬁts
 
t [pxtX(eit) − (pet + πit)eit] for i = A,B gives us the ﬁrst-order
7In many growth models an alternative but equivalent procedure is applied: The prices of the consump-
tion good are set equal to one in all periods (here px1 = px2 = 1) while the interest rate r is determined
endogenously.
8The last bracketed term [πi1ei1 + πi2ei2/(1 + r)] is the (positive or non-positive) tax payments of the




ei1 = pe + πi1 i = A,B, (8)
pxX
i
ei2 = pe + πi2 i = A,B. (9)
3 Unilateral carbon ceiling regulation
In the present section we assume that country A seeks to implement the ceiling ¯ e1 unilater-
ally knowing that country B is non-cooperative and refrains from climate policy altogether.
In general, lack of cooperation is not tantamount to climate policy inactivity (unless coun-
try B denies the impact of anthropogenic carbon emissions on the climate) because in the
absence of cooperation Nash behavior (best reply) would be in the interest of country B’s
government. However, assuming Nash behavior for country B’s government would require
introducing climate damage into the formal model which in turn would impede analytical
tractability and informative results. Apart from that ’technical’ argument we do not see
compelling reasons why the results to be derived below under the assumption of country
B’s inactivity should diﬀer qualitatively from those of an extended (numerical) model in
which the government of country B plays Nash.
Before we study country A’s unilateral ceiling policy it is useful to brieﬂy investigate
the fully cooperative cost-eﬀective ceiling policy for the purpose of later comparison. Sup-
pose both countries join forces and aim at implementing the ceiling ¯ e1 at minimum total
welfare cost w0 − w1, where w = ωAuA + ωBuB is world welfare with agreed-upon positive
welfare weights9 ωA and ωB and where w0 and w1, respectively, is world welfare10 before
and after the cooperative ceiling policy. In order to characterize analytically the coop-
erative cost-eﬀective ceiling policy, consider a social planner who maximizes world welfare
 
i=A,B ωiui subject to (1) - (5). The ﬁrst-order conditions of the corresponding Lagrangean
determine the eﬃcient allocation and the standard procedure of decentralization by prices
(and taxes), as outlined in the Appendix B, results in
Proposition 1.
(i) The cooperative tax policy (πA1,πA2,πB1,πB2) implements the ceiling ¯ e1 cost-eﬀectively,
if πA2 = πB2 = 0 and πA1 = πB1 = ¯ µ, where ¯ µ is the shadow price of the ceiling con-
straint ¯ e1 = eA1 + eB1.
9The welfare weights can be interpreted as being ﬁxed in a cost-sharing agreement which is taken as
given.
10World welfare is calculated here before environmental damage has been subtracted.
7(ii) The implementation of the ceiling distorts the allocation (compared to the no-policy
equilibrium) by driving a wedge between the marginal rates of intertemporal substitu-













for i = A,B. (10)
According to Proposition 1(i) the cost-eﬀective implementation of the ceiling is achieved
by a policy that leaves second-period emissions unregulated and levies a tax on ﬁrst-period
emissions that is uniform across countries11 and reﬂects the stringency of the ceiling. The
wedge (10) is also uniform across countries12 and is the only distortion caused by the coop-
erative ceiling policy. The Appendix B shows that the cooperative ceiling policy satisﬁes
consumption eﬃciency, (inter- and intra-period) production eﬃciency and in view of (10)
the ceiling drives a wedge between the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and the
ratio of inter-period marginal productivities of good X.
For the sake of completeness we note that the policy identiﬁed in Proposition 1(i) is
not the only cost-eﬀective ceiling policy. As shown in the Appendix B there is a large set
of policies with non-zero (and even negative) tax rates that all support the unique eﬃcient
allocation. Since the policy of Proposition 1(i) is the simplest of all these cost-eﬀective
policies we will disregard the others.
Having characterized as a benchmark the cooperative cost-eﬀective ceiling policy we
now turn to country A’s unilateral ceiling policy. To that end we need to presuppose the
existence of feasible strategies for country A to implement ¯ e1 unilaterally.13 In its eﬀort to
meet the ceiling ¯ e1 in unilateral action country A’s challenge is to restrict total ﬁrst-period
emissions to ¯ e1 via its tax rates (πA1,πA2) which have an impact on the national emissions
eA1 and eA2 but do not determine the ceiling directly. Knowing that the government of
country B is inactive, country A will be assumed to account for the responses to its tax
policy of the consumers and ﬁrms in both countries.
Unfortunately, informative results cannot be derived in the model used so far with
general production functions Xi and utility functions Ui. To make progress we will reduce
complexity in the remainder of the paper by assuming that the functions Xi and Ui are
11Rather than levying uniform national taxes in the ﬁrst period, one could also introduce a uniform
world-wide tax in each period and use the proceeds for meeting burden-sharing requirements.
12The feature that the wedge is the same across countries keeps the distortion small and will not carry
over to the case of unilateral ceiling policy to be studied later.
13For more details see Section 3.1 below.















i2 γ ∈]0,1[, i = A,B. (12)


































It is convenient to replace the ’original’ emission tax rates πA1 and πA2 by the modiﬁed
tax rates π1 and π2 throughout the rest of the paper. The appealing implication of this
substitution is the observation that πt = eBt − eAt, i.e. that πt is a direct measure of the
(intra-period) production distortion in period t.
The commodity demand functions
xi1 = γyi and xi2 =
(1 − γ)yi
px
for i = A,B (15)
follow from (6), (7) and (12), after some rearrangement of terms. We conclude that under
the functional forms (11) and (12) the competitive equilibria with unilateral ceiling policy
are fully characterized by the 12 equations (4), (6), (13), (14) and (15) which contain the 12
variables14 eA1, eA2, pe, px, xA1, xA2, xB1, xB2, yA, yB, π1 and π2. According to Walras Law,
one of the market clearing conditions in (4) is already implied by all other equations. Thus
we are left with 11 equations for 12 variables. As an implication, country A can choose
among a variety of ceiling policies for any predetermined (not too stringent) ceiling. The
existence of multiple ceiling policies is, of course, a precondition for both the opportunity
and the need to select a cost-eﬀective policy.
3.1 Characterization of feasible unilateral ceiling policies
To prepare for the analysis of cost-eﬀective unilateral ceiling policies, it is useful to ﬁrst
explore the properties of unilateral feasible ceiling policies. As shown in the preceding
section we have a degree of freedom in specifying unilateral ceiling policies and we will
exploit that discretion by investigating the properties of the set of feasible ceiling policies
generated by alternative ’ﬁxed’ levels of eA1.15 Consider a strictly binding ceiling ¯ e1 and
14The outputs xs
it are already eliminated via (11) and the inputs eB1 and eB2 via (3) and (5).
15Technically speaking, one could have taken as exogenous any other variable.
9denote by E the set of all eA1 for which a ceiling policy exists, i.e. for which the equations (4),
(6), (13), (14) and (15) have a solution. Observe that eA1 = 0 is a potential candidate (’at
the limit’) for supporting a ceiling policy because pe can take on the (low) level ˘ pe := a−b¯ e1
at which eB1 = ¯ e1 and π1 can be set high enough to push eA1 to zero. (pe < ˘ pe is incompatible
with ceiling policies because eB1 would then exceed ¯ e1.) eA1 > ¯ e1 is no feasible choice
because the extreme case eA1 = ¯ e1 requires a level of pe greater than, or equal to, the choke
price pe = a. As a consequence, E ⊂ [0, ¯ e1]. It is clear that in unilateral action country A
can implement those ceilings that require only small reductions of the ﬁrst-period emissions
prevailing in the laissez-faire economy. The more stringent the ceiling is and the ’smaller’
country A is relative to country B, the smaller will be the set of feasible unilateral ceiling
policies.
It is convenient to introduce the following additional notation. Deﬁne as eA1(πt = 0)
the value of eA1 that supports that particular ceiling policy which exhibits πt = 0 for
t = 1,2. Since the production functions are the same across countries, the ceiling policy
equilibrium for eA1(πt = 0) is also characterized by eAt = ¯ et/2. In addition, we combine

















 ¯ e1/2 < eA1 ≤ ¯ e1
 
.
Note that the sets Eℓ, {eA1(π2 = 0)}, Em, {¯ e1/2} and Eh form a partition of [0, ¯ e1], if and
only if eA1(π2 = 0) ≤ ¯ e1/2. We will show below that this condition is satisﬁed, indeed, and
that the partition is useful for characterizing the set of feasible ceiling policies, E. With this
notation we prove in the Appendix C the analytical properties of feasible ceiling policies
and summarize the results in
Proposition 2. Suppose the ceiling satisﬁes ¯ e1 ≤ e0
1, where e0
1 are total ﬁrst-period











eA1(π1 = 0) =
¯ e1







Moreover, ¯ e1 < e0
1 implies Em ⊂ E.
(ii) Over the entire domain E ⊂ [0, ¯ e1] of feasible policies, π1 and π2 are strictly decreasing
10in eA1, and the ceiling policy (π1,π2) is characterized by
(a) π1 > 0,π2 > 0 if eA1 ∈ Eℓ,
(b) π1 > 0,π2 = 0 if eA1 = eA1(π2 = 0),
(c) π1 > 0 > π2 if eA1 ∈ Em,
(d) π1 = 0,π2 < 0 if eA1 = eA1(π1 = 0) = ¯ e1/2,
(e) π1 < 0,π2 < 0 if eA1 ∈ Eh.
(iii) Over the entire domain E ⊂ [0, ¯ e1] of feasible policies, eA2 and pe are strictly increasing
in eA1. Over the subdomain [eA1(π2 = 0), ¯ e1/2] of E, px is strictly increasing in eA1.
(iv) Over the subdomain [0,eA1(π2 = 0)] ∩ E of E, the prices pe and px are lower than
their counterparts p0
e and p0
x in the laissez-faire economy, if ¯ e1 < e0
1.
Eℓ Eℓ Em Em Eh
eA1 = 0 eA1(π2 = 0),
π1 > 0




π1 > 0,π2 > 0 π1 > 0 > π2 π1 < 0,π2 < 0
eA1 = ¯ e1
Figure 1: Unilateral ceiling policies and the domain E
Some comments on Proposition 2 are in order. Although the polar case ¯ e1 = e0
1
does not qualify as climate policy, it is included in Proposition 2(i) because it will help
understanding the rationale of cost-eﬀective policies below. Proposition 2(i) conﬁrms that
there exists an intermediate non-empty interval Em of inputs eA1, if and only if the ceiling
is strictly binding. Em is of special interest, because the ceiling policy is characterized by
π1 > 0 and π2 < 0, if and only if the corresponding equilibrium exhibits eA1 ∈ Em (see
Proposition 2(ii)(c). An important insight is that Em ⊂ E, if ¯ e1 < e0
1 and eA1(πt = 0) ∈ E
for t = 1,2.
According to Proposition 2(ii) the tax rates π1 and π2 are both strictly decreasing in
eA1 and that proposition also allows to determine the switches of these ﬁnal instruments
from taxes proper to subsidies. The information of Proposition 2(ii) is illustrated in Figure
1 and 2 for the case ¯ e1 < e0
1. The tax/subsidy switching points deﬁne the partition Eℓ,
{eA1(π2 = 0)}, Em, {¯ e1/2} and Eh of the interval [0, ¯ e1] which we consider to be equal to
the set E of feasible policies for convenience of exposition. At low levels of eA1, i.e. for
eA1 ∈ Eℓ, the ceiling policy works via emission taxes proper, π1 > 0,π2 > 0; at intermediate
11π1






π1 > 0 > π2 π1 < 0,π2 < 0
π1 Eℓ Em Eh
eA1
eA1(π2 = 0) ¯ e1
2 ¯ e1
0
Figure 2: Classiﬁcation of feasible unilateral ceiling policies
levels of eA1, i.e. for eA1 ∈ Em, we need a ﬁrst-period tax, π1 > 0, but a second-period
subsidy, π2 < 0; at high levels of eA1, i.e. for eA1 ∈ Eh, the ceiling policy works via emission
subsidies, π1 < 0,π2 < 0. To illustrate the limiting case ¯ e1 = e0
1, Figure 1 and 2 need to be
modiﬁed such that the points eA1(π1 = 0) and eA1(π2 = 0) = ¯ e1/2 in Figure 1 and on the
abscissa of Figure 2 collapse into one point, namely eA1(π1 = 0) = eA1(π2 = 0) = ¯ e1/2. As
a consequence, there are no feasible ceiling policies of the type (π1 > 0,π2 < 0) anymore.
As established in Proposition 2(iii), pe is strictly increasing in eA1. px has also been
shown to be strictly increasing in eA1 on {{eA1(π2 = 0)},Em,{¯ e1/2}}, but non-monotonicity
for small and for large values of eA1 cannot be ruled out. If px were increasing in eA1 on
the total set E, the implication would be that all ceiling policies would be characterized by
π1 > ¯ γπ2 - independent of the sign of their tax rates. Unfortunately, analytical complexity
prevents proving that conjecture.
Another remarkable feature of feasible policies is that eA2 is increasing in eA1 (see
Proposition 2(iii)). To see the implication, take as a point of departure a ceiling policy
for the lowest possible level of eA1 in which country A exports fossil fuel. As country
A’s resource stock αA¯ e is given its exports of fossil fuel shrink with successive parametric
increases in eA1 such that exports eventually turn into imports. Alternatively, if country
A has imported fossil fuel initially (e.g. in the case αA = 0) its fossil fuel imports would
expand. All these shifts are accompanied by rising prices of fossil fuel such that country
A’s export revenues shrink or its import bill rises.
12Proposition 2(iv) compares the prices pe and px in ceiling policies with their counter-
parts in the laissez-faire economy. The fossil fuel price is declining in eA1 on the interval
0,eA1(π2 = 0)] ∩ E under policies reducing the world demand for fossil fuel. As discussed
above, it is unclear whether the price for second-period consumption, px is monotone on
that interval. If it also shrinks that would be equivalent to a price hike for ﬁrst-period
consumption because the latter is taken as numéraire. Note, however, that the interval
[0,eA1(π2 = 0)] is rather small because eA1(π2 = 0) < ¯ e1/2. Ceiling policies on that interval
do not involve subsidies.
What is the information Proposition 2 provides on the set E of values of eA1 for which
a ceiling policy exists? We know that E ⊂ [0, ¯ e1] and that Em ⊂ E (Proposition 2(i)), but
otherwise Proposition 2 characterizes ceiling policies for values of eA1 ∈ ¯ Em := {eA1 ∈
[0, ¯ e1]
 
 eA1 / ∈ Em} presupposing that E ∩ ¯ Em  = ∅. We prove now by means of a numerical
example that E ∩ ¯ Em is non-empty, indeed. For the parameter values a = 0.2, b = 0.1,
¯ e = 2, ¯ e1 = 0.95 and γ = 0.5 we calculate e0
1 = 1 > ¯ e1 = 0.95, eA1(π2 = 0) = 0.270,
eA1(π1 = 0) = 0.475 = ¯ e1/2 and ﬁnd that
E = [0,0.921] = Eℓ ∪ {0.271} ∪ Em ∪ {0.475}∪]0.475,0.921].
It turns out that emissions eA1 ∈]0.921,0.95] ⊂ Eh are incompatible with a feasible ceiling
policy because associated to eA1 = 0.921 is eA2 = 1.079 such that eA1 + eA2 = 2 = ¯ e. Since
eA2 is increasing in eA1 the market equilibrium condition of fossil fuel (3) is violated for
values of eA1 larger than 0.921. Nonetheless, the important message of the example is that
E ∩ Eℓ  = ∅ and E ∩ Eh  = ∅. It is also worth noting that in this numerical example px
is strictly increasing in eA1 which implies π1 > ¯ γπ2 for all eA1 ∈ E and thus supports the
conjecture that this property holds for all feasible policies. The associated price px varies
from 0.808 to 0.972.
How do the allocative distortions generated by the unilateral policy compare to those
of the cooperative policy that we have characterized in Proposition 1(ii)? Interestingly,
consumption eﬃciency carries over to the unilateral policy, but in addition to the wedge
between the marginal rates of intertemporal substitution in production and consumption at
the unilateral policy the ratios of marginal productivities diﬀer intra- and intertemporally
and hence production eﬃciency is violated.
The speciﬁcation of feasible unilateral ceiling policies presented here certainly is an
interesting piece of information in its own right. However, since country A’s welfare - and
its cost of climate policy - varies with the policy chosen from the set of feasible ceiling
policies, it is also of great interest to know which of those policies is country A’s welfare
13maximizing - or cost-eﬀective - policy. We turn to this issue in the following section.
3.2 Cost-eﬀective unilateral ceiling policies
Suppose the government of country A knows what we have established above that for each
eA1 ∈ E there is a policy (π1,π2) implementing the predetermined ceiling ¯ e1 ≤ e0
1 given that
the government of country B refrains from climate policy. If it carries out the ceiling policy
related to some eA1 ∈ E, the representative consumer of country A attains the utility
uA(eA1) = [xA1(eA1)]
γ   [xA2(eA1)]
1−γ , (16)
where we use here, temporarily only, the notation xA1(eA1) and xA2(eA1) to indicate that the
levels of consumption xA1 and xA2 in (16) are those prevailing in the competitive equilibrium
corresponding to the ceiling policy related to eA1 ∈ E. Our subsequent analysis is based
on the assumption that the utility (16) is single-peaked in eA1.16
Invoking (15) we rewrite (16) as uA(eA1) = γγ(1−γ)1−γpx(eA1)γ−1yA(eA1). We diﬀer-



































bpx(π1 − ¯ γπ2)
xs
1 − ¯ γpeπ2
(19)





Bt for t = 1,2. According to
(17) the response of welfare to a small change in the ceiling policy (induced by deA1) is
determined by the income eﬀect (18) and the price eﬀect (19). Since the tax rates π1 and
π2 are not sign-constrained, the signs of these eﬀects are unclear. We consider (15), (18)










1 − ¯ γpeπ2
> 0. (20)
Equation (20) gives rise to the following observations proved in the Appendix D.
16Our strong conjecture is that single-peakedness holds unconditionally but we have not been able to
establish that analytically because several terms with opposite signs are involved. For the numerical example
of Section 3.1 the single-peakedness assumption is satisﬁed.






γ − yB yields dyA = bπ1
γ deA1 − dyB. Inserting (C7) of the Appendix C
establishes (18). For the derivation of (19) see the proof of Proposition 2(iii) in the Appendix C.
14Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose ¯ e1 = e0














(π1 > 0,π2 > 0)
(π1 = π2 = 0)















(ii) Suppose ¯ e1 < e0
1.
(a) If αA ≤ 1/2, country A’s cost-eﬀective ceiling policy belongs to the set {Eℓ∪
{eA1(π2 = 0)} ∪ Em} ∩ E and exhibits π1 > 0. The sign of π2 is unclear.
(b) If αA ≥ 1/2 and γ ≥ 1/2, country A’s cost-eﬀective ceiling policy belongs to the
set {Em ∪ {¯ e1/2} ∪ Eh} ∩ E and exhibits π2 < 0. The sign of π1 is unclear.
Proposition 3(i) takes up the limiting case ¯ e1 = e0
1 again and it demonstrates the link of
the issue at hand with the standard theory of strategic environmental policy and interna-
tional trade (Rauscher 1994, Ulph 1996). That link exists because carbon emissions are
proportional to the consumption/burning of fossil fuel and because fossil fuel is traded on
a world market. As a consequence, if country A imports fuel and taxes (at a positive rate)
its domestic fuel consumption, that tax is also levied on the amount of fuel imported, and
to that extent the tax incidence is the same as that of an import tariﬀ on fossil fuel. The
tax diminishes the world demand for fossil fuel, ceteris paribus, and thus reduces the fossil
fuel price because the global supply of fossil fuel is ﬁxed. Country A generates this terms-
of-trade eﬀect intentionally to reduce its fossil-fuel import bill. Conversely, if country A
exports fossil fuel and taxes (at a negative rate) its domestic fuel consumption that neg-
ative tax is equivalent to an export subsidy on fossil fuel. It raises the world demand for
fossil fuel, ceteris paribus, and thus raises the fossil fuel price given the ﬁxed global supply
of fossil fuel. That terms-of-trade eﬀect increases country A’s revenues from fossil fuel ex-
ports. In sum, the government of country A chooses its policy in an eﬀort to manipulate the
terms-of-trade eﬀect to enhance domestic welfare. For ¯ e1 = e0
1, the laissez-faire equilibrium
with eA1 = e0













which readily reveals the incentives of country A’s government to deviate from the laissez-
faire equilibrium. The government knows that it can do better by acting strategically and
chooses a ceiling policy with emission subsidies in both periods which is associated with
15a higher [lower] level of eA1, if ∆eA > 0 [∆eA < 0]. If ∆eA > 0, increasing eA1 raises
pe and with it the fuel export revenues, ceteris paribus. However, this favorable price
eﬀect is eventually neutralized by a countervailing quantity eﬀect. That quantity eﬀect
arises because we have established in Proposition 2 above that eA2 increases along with eA1
such that increasing eA1 diminishes the amount of fuel exported (∆eA). The government of
country A seeks to balance both eﬀects to maximize domestic welfare. Analogous arguments
apply to the case αA < 1/2.
Proposition 3(ii) addresses the relevant case ¯ e1 < e0
1 and conﬁrms that if country A’s
share of the fossil fuel stock is small cost eﬀectiveness requires an emission tax proper in
the ﬁrst period (π1 > 0) while the cost eﬀective second-period emission tax is negative
(π2 < 0) if country A owns a large share of the fossil fuel stock. We have argued in Section
3 that the simplest (and hence the relevant) fully cooperative policy to attain the unique
cost-eﬀective solution is to levy a uniform emission tax in period 1 and leave second-period
emissions unregulated. In sharp contrast, country A’s unilateral cost-eﬀective ceiling policy
generally consists in regulating domestic emissions in both periods and the tax rates shift
from positive to negative with the size of country A’s share of the fossil fuel stock. Which
of the feasible policies is the cost-eﬀective one only depends on the countries’ fossil fuel
endowments.
Although Proposition 3(ii) does not fully characterize country A’s cost-eﬀective policy,
the principal message appears to be similar to that of the case of the weakly binding ceiling
¯ e1 = e0
1 in Proposition 3(i). When country A’s fossil fuel stock is small [large] relative to
that of country B, the cost-eﬀective policy tends to be related to a relatively high [low] level
of eA1. In other words, when country A’s share of the world stock of fossil energy increases,
country A eventually turns into a fuel exporter whose strategic interest it is to either lower
the positive emission tax or even subsidize rather than tax emissions. In both cases the
domestic use of fossil energy is stimulated which in turn boosts the fossil fuel price and thus
increases country A’s fuel export revenues. To further substantiate that insight we rewrite
the ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing utility (20) in the following way:
duA
deA1
= 0 ⇐⇒ F(eA1;αA) = H(eA1), (21)
where
F(eA1;αA) := π1(eA1) + γ[αA¯ e − eA1 − eA2(eA1)],
H(eA1) := [π1(eA1) − ¯ γπ2(eA1)]   G(eA1).
The term G(eA1) deﬁned in (20) depends on eA1 in a complicated way. For our purposes
16it suﬃces, however, to take advantage of the observation that under mild conditions18
G(eA1) ∈ [0,1]. In that case the graph of the function H is plotted in Figure 3 as the
winding curve in the area between the curve π1 − ¯ γπ2 and the eA1-axis. The function F is
strictly decreasing in19 eA1 and has the property that its graph shifts upward with increasing
αA. Figure 3 depicts four alternative graphs of F for diﬀerent shares αA. The greater the
share αA is, the further to the right is the graph of F. The cost-eﬀective ceiling policy
is determined by the intersection point of the graphs of F and H. The straightforward
implication is that the greater is country A’s share αA of the world stock of fossil fuel,
the higher is the level of eA1 that characterizes the cost-eﬀective ceiling policy. If for
low shares αA the cost-eﬀective policy is in Eℓ, it moves into Em and likely further into
Eh with successively increasing αA. The information added by Figure 3 to the results of
Proposition 3 is that the level of eA1 in the cost-eﬀective policy rises smoothly with share
αA. Unfortunately, however, Figure 3 does not provide rigorous conditions under which the
cost-eﬀective policy belongs to a speciﬁc subset of the interval [0, ¯ e1].























eA1(π2 = 0) ¯ e1
2 Q
Figure 3: Cost-eﬀective unilateral ceiling policies depending on country A’s fossil-energy
endowment
18For details on this constraint see the proof of Proposition 3(ii) in the Appendix D.
19Single-peakedness of the function uA from (16) requires that FeA1 < HeA1 for all eA1. Although sign





< −(2 + γ) is very small
which is why FeA1 < HeA1 for all eA1 is very likely.
174 Concluding remarks
This paper builds on the proposition that reducing climate change damage requires curbing
worldwide carbon emissions in the near to medium future (ceiling policy) and is therefore
conceptually in line with the political goal of keeping the world mean temperature from
rising 2◦ Celsius or more above preindustrial levels. After more than two decades of interna-
tional climate negotiations the prospects for a fully cooperative ceiling policy appear to be
bleak. Nonetheless, several countries are taking action to abate domestic emissions and/or
have announced to do so in the far future. But owing to free riding and carbon leakage,
the net eﬀects of such uncoordinated unilateral policies on global medium term emissions
are unclear for the abating countries. That would be diﬀerent if the ’willing countries’
cooperate in a sub-global climate coalition, as we assume in the present paper. Although
carbon leakage is still an issue in that case, such a coalition can implement some agreed
upon medium-term global emission ceiling in joint action and can, conceptually at least,
calculate the cost accruing to the coalition. As we have shown, even more important is that
the coalition can choose from a set of policies that meet a given ceiling but diﬀer in costs
to be borne by the coalition. It will therefore seek to identify and choose that particular
unilateral policy which minimizes its costs of implementing the agreed-upon ceiling.
We have characterized the unilateral feasible ceiling policies and the cost-eﬀective
policy and have compared that regulation with the fully cooperative cost-eﬀective ceiling
policy. We found that the unilateral cost-eﬀective policy requires regulating the coalition’s
emissions in all periods while in case of full cooperation cost eﬀectiveness can be attained
through a ceiling policy consisting of a world-wide emission tax levied in the ﬁrst period
only that is uniform across countries. We also found that the greater is the coalition’s
share of the world stock of fossil energy the more likely it is that the cost-eﬀective second
period emission tax or even the taxes in both periods are negative, i.e. the unilateral cost-
eﬀective policy may call for emission subsidies rather than emission taxes. When the climate
coalition’s share of the world stock of fossil energy increases it turns into an exporter of
fossil fuel eventually and has an incentive to stimulate domestic fuel demand via emission
subsidies in order to increase its fuel export revenues.
The price to be paid for the substantive analytical results achieved in the paper is
simplifying assumptions. Our model consists of two periods and two countries only and
applies, in addition, parametric functions for production and utility. The countries are alike
except for their stock of fossil energy resources, and the negative climate externality being
the raison d’être for climate policy is not contained in the formal model. Eichner and Pethig
18(2011) show that omitting consumption externalities, abatement technologies and multiple
periods is not an essential restriction - although extending the model along these lines would
prevent us from reaching meaningful results. Since it is the expected cost of climate policy
that makes countries reluctant to take action the quest for cost eﬀectiveness is indispensible
for making progress in practical climate policy. Therefore, more work is desirable on the
characterization of cost-eﬀective sub-global ceiling policies. Although simple models like
the model in the present paper are a necessary step on the way to a fuller understanding
of unilateral climate policy, the restrictions one needs to impose for obtaining analytical
results suggest that tractable analytical models should be supplemented by large-scale, less
stylized models which are calibrated with realistic empirical data.
It should also be noted, however, that the strategic use of emission taxes identiﬁed
and characterized in our simple analytical model will not be absent in cost-eﬀective policies
of sub-global climate coalitions in more complex settings including those where countries
outside the coalition play Nash or those where stock-dependent extraction costs, low-carbon
backstops etc. suggest climate policies that leave part of the fossil-fuel resources in the
ground.
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Appendix
List of notation introduced to simplify the exposition:




1 − ¯ γpeπ2






















, t = 1,2.
eA1(πt = 0) is the value of eA1 that leads to ceiling policy which exhibits πt = 0 for t = 1,2.
px(eA1) is the price px that prevails in the ceiling-policy equilibrium for eA1 ∈ E. We use
analogous notation for equilibrium values of other variables, e.g. xA2(eA1) etc. Letters with
superscript "0", e.g. e0
1, denote the value of the respective variable in the ’benchmark’
competitive laissez-faire equilibrium.
A. On the market for savings and the choice of numéraires
Consider the following subset of equations of the model of Section 2:










i2 + pe(αi¯ e − ei1 − ei2) i = A,B, (A3)
yi = xi1 + pxxi2 i = A,B. (A4)
21The equations (A3) and (A4) presuppose r = 0. The equations (A4) represent the countries’
consolidated (’present value’) budget constraints in which the information about incomes




i1 − peei1 + αipee1 i = A,B, (A5)
yi2 = pxx
s
i2 − peei2 + αipee2 i = A,B (A6)
and the period budget constraints
yi1 = si + xi1 i = A,B, (A7)
yi2 + (1 + r)si = pxxi2 i = A,B. (A8)
si are the sign-unconstrained savings of country i and r is the market interest rate. The
credit market equilibrium requires
sA + sB = 0. (A9)
The 9 new equations (A5) - (A9) contain the 7 new variables yA1,yB1,yA2,yB2,sA,sB,r that
are not in the model of Section 2. If the modiﬁcation (A5) - (A9) of the model of Section
2 is adopted, the 4 equations (A3) and (A4) as well as the 2 variables yA and yB drop out.
Ultimately that leaves us with 5 new variables and 5 new equations. However, adding the






B2 − xA2 − xB2) + pe(e2 − eA2 − eB2) + (1 + r)(sA + sB) = 0. (A10)
It is straightforward that (A1), (A2) and (A10) imply (A9). Hence (A9) is redundant and
thus provides the degree of freedom - and the necessity - to ﬁx one price in addition to
the price for the consumption good in period 1 which is already normalized (px1 ≡ 1).
That degree of freedom is often used to set px = px2 ≡ 1. In the present paper we
choose r ≡ 0, instead. It is easy to see that with this normalization the present value
of income, yi1 + yi2/(1 + r), coincides with (A3) and the consolidated budget constraint
yi1 + yi2/(1 + r) + si = si + xi1 + pxxi2/(1 + r) coincides with (A4).
B. Cooperative cost-eﬀective carbon ceiling regulation
The Lagrangean corresponding to the problem of maximizing
 













B(eBt) − xAt − xBt
 
+ λe(¯ e − eA1 − eA2 − eB1 − eB2) + ¯ λ(¯ e1 − eA1 − eB1). (B1)
22The ﬁrst-order conditions of solving (B1) yield
Uxi2
Uxi1
= µx2 for i = A,B, (B2)
Xei1 = µe + ¯ µ for i = A,B, (B3)
µx2X
i
ei2 = µe for i = A,B, (B4)
where µx2 := λx2/λx1,µe := λe/λx1 and ¯ µ := ¯ λ/λx1 are positive shadow prices in terms of
ﬁrst-period output X evaluated at the solution of (B1). To make use of the information
contained in (B2) - (B4) about the eﬃcient allocation in the standard procedure of decen-
tralization by prices (and taxes), denote a cooperative tax policy as π := (πA1,πA2,πB1,πB2)





 πA1 = πB1,πA2 = πB2,πA1 = ¯ µ + πA2,πA2 ∈] − ∞,µe]
 
.
It is easy to see that with the deﬁnitions π ∈ Π, pe = µe −πA2 and px = µx2 the conditions
(B2), (B3) and (B4) coincide with the conditions (7), (8) and (9). This is true for all π ∈ Π
which implies, in particular, that the allocation of inputs and outputs is the same for all
π ∈ Π . Hence world income is uniquely determined. In the social planner’s solution the









B2), such that the consumption bundles (xi1,xi2)
in the solution of (B1) maximize utility Ui ( ) subject to the income y∗
i. However, since pe is
not invariant with respect to the choice of π ∈ Π, yi from (6) depends on π. We account for
that relationship by writing yi = yi(π) and observe that yi(π)  = y∗
i, in general. To assign
the incomes y∗
A and y∗
B to the countries A and B, respectively, we deﬁne T(π) := yA(π)−y∗
A
and let country A transfer the (positive or non-positive) amount T(π) of its income yA(π)
to country B.
To sum up, the cooperative tax policy π = (πA1,πA2,πB1,πB2) implements the ceiling
¯ e1 cost-eﬀectively, if and only if π ∈ Π. In the associated ceiling-policy equilibrium the
prices are20 pe = µe − πA2 and px = µx2. Moreover, country A needs to make a suitable
income transfer to country B whose sign and magnitude depends on πA2, (ωA,ωB) and on
















































for i = A,B. (intertemporal distortion) (B7)
20pe = µe − πA2 ≥ 0 is secured by the condition πA2 ∈] − ∞,µe] in the deﬁnition of the set Π.
23C. Proof of Proposition 2
Since the proofs of diﬀerent parts of Proposition 2 are interrelated, the subsequent proof
does not follow the sequence of results as listed in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2(iii), ﬁrst sentence: To determine how ceiling policies diﬀer in their re-
spective equilibria, we will leave the ceiling ¯ e1 unchanged, disturb the initial equilibrium
by a small (exogenous) variation in eA1, and then determine the displacement eﬀects char-
acterizing the new competitive equilibrium reached after the shock. Total diﬀerentiation of
the equations (4) for t = 1, (6), (13), (14) and (15) leads to
dπi = −2deAi i = A,B, (C1)
dpe = bdeA1, (C2)
pe
px
dpx + bpxdeA2 = dpe, (C3)







dpx i = A,B, (C5)
dyA = bπ1deA1 + bpxπ2deA2 + ∆eAdpe + x
s
A2dpx, (C6)
dyB = −∆eAdpe + x
s
B2dpx, (C7)
π1deA1 = dxA1 + dxB1. (C8)
dπ1
deA1 = −2 < 0 and
dpe
deA1 = b > 0 are obvious from (C1) and (C2). Next insert dpe from
(C2) into (C3) and consider the equations (C4), (C5) and (C7) in (C8) to obtain
pe
px
dpx + bpxdeA2 = bdeA1 and ¯ γx
s
2dpx + b¯ γpxπ2deA2 = bπ1deA1.








bpx(π1 − ¯ γπ2)
xs












2−peπ2). Note that π2 = eB2 − eA2 follows from (13)
and (14) such that pxxs
2 − peπ2 = pxxs
A2 + peeA2 + pxxs
B2 − peeB2 > 0, because the proﬁt
pxxs
B2 −peeB2 is positive. Likewise, xs
1 −peπ1 > 0 and therefore deA2/deA1 > 0. From (C1)





Proposition 2(ii)(b). π1 and π2 have been shown to be strictly decreasing in eA1 over
E in the proof of the ﬁrst sentence of Proposition 2(iii) above. We proceed in several steps.

















2 = ¯ γp0
x with xs∗







24Proof. Observe ﬁrst that the equations (4), (6) and (15) imply
x
s
1 = ¯ γpxx
s
2 (C10)
which holds in laissez-faire as well as with ceiling regulation. In the latter case we have
x
s
































t is the maximum possible production in t under the constraint ¯ et which is attained if and










2 if ¯ e1 = e0
1.  















2 = ¯ γpx.



















￿. As π2 = 0 implies eA2 = eB2 = ¯ e2/2,xs
2 = xs∗
2
follows. Moreover, (π1 = 0,π2 = 0) is a ceiling policy, if and only if ¯ e1 = e0
1. Otherwise
we must have π1  = 0 and hence xs
1 < xs∗
1 . Combined with Lemma 1 these ﬁndings prove
Lemma 2.  
Lemma 3. If (π1,π2 = 0) is a ceiling policy for ¯ e1 < e0
1 then π1 > 0.
Proof. Contrary to the claim suppose that (π1 ≤ 0,π2 = 0) is a ceiling policy. In that
case we have pe = a − beB1 = px(a − b¯ e2/2), eB1 ≤ ¯ e1/2 and therefore px ≥
2a−b¯ e1
2a−b¯ e2. In





2 which is smaller than
2a−b¯ e1
2a−b¯ e2 because of
¯ e1 < e0







2a−b¯ e2 ≤ px. However, px < p0
x follows from
Lemma 2. That contradiction proves Lemma 3 and thus Proposition 2(ii)(b).  
Proposition 2(i). Suppose ﬁrst that ¯ e1 < e0
1 and observe that eA1(π2 = 0) < ¯ e1/2
holds because π1 > 0 at eA1(π2 = 0) according to Proposition 2(ii)(b) and because π1 is
strictly decreasing in eA1 according to (C1). Hence the level of eA1 at which π1 becomes
zero is greater than eA1(π2 = 0). In fact, we have eA1(π1 = 0) = ¯ e1/2 > eA1(π2 = 0) which
proves Em  = ∅. From ¯ e1 = e0
1 follows eA1(π1 = 0) = eA1(π2 = 0) = ¯ e1/2 and therefore
Em = ∅.  
Proposition 2(ii) cont’d. We have shown in the proof of the ﬁrst sentence of Propo-
sition 2(iii) above that π1 and π2 are strictly decreasing over the entire interval E. When
25combined with the result of Proposition 2(ii)(b), that observation completes the proof of
Proposition 2(ii).
Proposition 2(iii), second sentence. According to Proposition 2(ii)(c), ceiling policies
for eA1 over the interval Em are characterized by π1 > 0 and π2 < 0. That implies π1 > ¯ γπ2
and dpx/deA1 > 0 via (C9).
Proposition 2(iv). Consider ﬁrst the policy (π1 > 0,π2 = 0) and observe that eB1 >
¯ e1/2 > eA1 owing to π1 > 0. In view of (14) that leads to pe = a − beB1 < a − b(¯ e1/2) <
a − b(e0
1/2) = p0
e. px < p0
x follows from Lemma 2. We have established that px and pe are
increasing in eA1 over Eℓ. That completes the proof of Proposition 2(iv).  
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3(i). For π1 = π2 = 0 and ¯ e1 = e0
1 we are in the laissez-faire equilibrium. The
only way the countries A and B may diﬀer from each other are diﬀering fossil-fuel ownership
shares αA and αB. If αA = αB no trade in fossil fuel and the commodity takes place
(∆eA = 0). Since the fuel demands are eAt = eBt = ¯ et/2 for t = 1,2, it is straightforward
that in the laissez-faire equilibrium we have ∆eA ≷ if and only if αA ≷ αB. Combining this










(20) completes the proof.
Proposition 3(ii)(a). Consider the feasible ceiling policy (π1 = 0,π2 < 0) as point
of departure. In the corresponding equilibrium, country A’s fossil fuel consumptions are
eA1 = ¯ e1/2 and eA2 > ¯ e2/2 and hence eA1 + eA2 > ¯ e/2. From the presupposition αA ≤ 1/2






(γ∆eA + ¯ γπ2G) < 0.
Single-peakedness of uA in eA1 then establishes Proposition 3(ii)(a).
Proposition 3(ii)(b). Now we take the feasible ceiling policy (π1 > 0,π2 = 0) as point
of departure. In the corresponding equilibrium, country A’s fossil-fuel consumptions are
eA1 < ¯ e1/2 and eA2 = ¯ e2/2 and hence eA1 + eA2 < ¯ e/2. From the presupposition αA ≥ 1/2






[π1(1 − G) + γ∆eA] > 0.









2 since π2 = 0 . Therefore









B2) + (1 − γ)(x
s
A2 − xA2)]
⇐⇒ 0 < px [γ(xA2 + xB2) + (1 − γ)(x
s
A2 − xA2)]











The right side of the last inequality is less than 1/2 and may even be negative. Hence the
qualiﬁcation γ ≥ 1/2 in Proposition 3(ii)(b) is a very weak suﬃcient condition.  
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